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The Cult of Empiricism in 
Psychology, and Beyond* 
STEPHEN TOULMIN 
DAVID E. LEARY 
At some stage in it!. development, any field of intellectual discussion or scientific 
speculation may reach a point at which it begins to generate large numbers of 
"empirical" questions, that is, questions whose answers must refer to carefully docu-
mented observations, or even to controlled experiments. In physics, this happened 
most strikingly in the course of the seventeenth century; in biology, the comparable 
stage was not reached until around 1770, rising to its peak in the course of the 
nineteenth century (Toulmin, 1972; Toulmin & Goodfield, 1962); whereas in 
psychology, it has become customary-though a trifle arbitrary-to argue that this 
hc:ppened just one hundred years ago, with the establishment of Wilhelm Wundt's 
pioneer psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1879. 
There need be no serious objection to saying this, on one condition. If we speak 
of Wundt and 1879 as defining the moment at which scientific psychology became 
a genuinely "empirical" science, we must take care to talk about Wilhelm Wundt 
himself, as he existed historically in late nineteenth-century Germany, and not 
•Revisions of this paper were written while the senior author was a Fellow at The Hastings Center, 
Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y. and the collaborating 
author was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, Calif. 
Acknowledgment is made to the National Endowment for the Humanities (Grant No. FC 20029-82) 
and to the National Science Foundation (Grants No. SES 80-08051 and BNS 82-06304). 
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about the Wundtian heritage that has developed during the subsequent hundred 
years, particularly in the United States. For, in some significant respects, the 
intellectual constraints that American psychologists have tended to place upon 
themselves since Wundt-in the name of "empiricism" -have been far more 
rigorous and exacting than any which Wundt himself intended, and also far more 
rigorous and exacting than was ever the case in other fledging sciences. Neither in 
physics nor in biology did the introduction of experimental procedures lead scien-
tists to cut their diplomatic relations with the larger philosophical debates out of 
which their newly defined "empirical" questions had emerged and from which 
those questions had acquired their original meaning. On the contrary: in both 
sciences, an elaborate analytical and theoretical debate continued for most of a 
century after the onset of this new "empirical" pnase of investigation. These 
debates were concerned with two groups of theoretical issues carried over from the 
preceding period~ -On the one hand, there were conceptual discussions about the 
fundamental nature of matter and force (or life and adaptation), discussions that had 
already been under way before the beginnings of the new empirical physics and 
biology; and on the other hand, there were discussions about the intellectual rele-
vance of the new empirical investigations to the larger theoretical issues from which 
they had developed. These latter discussions were aimed, in particular, at clarifying 
the question, "What is an empirical science of physics or biology, and what should 
it become?" 
Wundt's Dual Program for Psychology and Its Bifurcation 
If we look at Wundt's own case, we find just the same sort of thing happening once 
again in psychology. The establishment of Wundt's new laboratory was not in-
tended to inaugurate a separate, autonomous field of experimental psychology, 
independent of all other subjects (Leary, 1979; Met~aux, 1980). Rather, Wundt saw 
it as contributing toward one legitimate research program, among others. In 
Wundt's own hands, psychological issues initially ret.ained their earlier connections 
with the logic and epistemology oflmmanuel Kant, the physiology of Hermann van 
Helmholtz, and the psychophysics of Gustav Theodor Fechner (Wundt, 1862, 
1863; Richards, 1980; Woodward, 1982); and even after he had defined his nar-
rower research program for the experimental study of "the manifold of conscious-
ness" (Wundt, 1874), he never suggested that this should constitute the entirety of 
psychology, still less that the results obtained from this new program could be used 
to bu!Jq a psychological science free of all more general intellectual connections, 
either with philosophical arguments or with contemporary theoretical issues in 
neighboring fields of science. Indeed, Wundt (1880-1883, 1886) went to consider-
able effort to develop his own systems oflogic (including epistemology) and ethics-
not to mention his own system of philosophy ( 1889)-each of which he saw as 
595 
III. PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS INTERSECTING DISCIPLINES 
intimately related to, and dependent upon, psychology. Conversely, psychology 
itself, in his scheme, was and should be susceptible to philosophical analysis. The 
depth of Wundt's belief in this two-way interdependence between psychology and 
philosophy was perhaps best illustrated in his (1913) vehement opposition to the 
proposed separation of psychology and philosophy in German universities (see Ash, 
1980). According to Wundt, neither empirical observation (or experiment) nor 
rational analysis alone could constitute true, complete science. Neither psychology 
nor philosophy could fulfill its task without the other. In taking this stand, Wundt 
showed that he was clearly aware of the historical dependence of psychology_.:.even 
the new experimental psychology-upon the discipline of philosophy. (On the 
indebtedness of the so-called "new psychology" to philosophy, see Leary, 1978, 
1979, l 980a, l 980b, 1982.) 
To put the point in a word, Wundt was not a "positivist," though he did share 
with Ernst Mach (and many others) a view of experience as the primary "given" 
from which the different natural sciences arrive at their respective subject matters by 
various distinctive modes of abstraction. Although he was cautious in his metaphys-
ical speculation, he did not shrink from the discussion of the nature of his subject 
matter, which he construed as consciousness, or the mind. Besides formulating a 
rather dynamic view of the mind as "actuality," he also pointed out the practical (as 
well as intellectual) necessity for a philosophical doctrine about the relation be-
tween mind and body: methodological decisions-Le., day-to-day empirical proce-
dures-are dependent upon such a doctrine. For himself, he preferred and argued 
for a psychophysical parallelism, at least on a pragmatic level; ultimately, this 
parallelism reflected Wundt's double-aspect monism (Blumenthal, 1980; Richards, 
1980). Still, the point is that Wundt, the "physiological psychologist," argued on 
essentially philosophical grounds for an autonomous psychology, i.e., a nonreduc-
tionistic psychology; and he saw no other way to argue the point, pro or con. 
In addition to his belief in the integral relationship between psychology and 
philosophy-and in addition to his belief that psychologists should continue to 
address the epistemological, ethical, and ontological issues that had given rise to 
psychological science in the first place-Wundt held yet another supposition that 
helped to define his research program. We are referring to the distinction he made 
between different aspects of mental life, i.e., between those that do and those that 
do not lend themselves to investigation by experimental methods. His view was that 
purely experimental methods were appropriate only to a restricted range of mental 
activities and phenomena. In particular, he excluded from their scope just about all 
those aspects of mental life that are nowadays classified under the heading of 
"higher mental functions." These other aspects of mental life could be brought 
within the grasp of a scientific psychology, but only if they were handled in quite 
different ways. So Wundt conceived a kind of historico-anthropological method for 
investigating the "higher" modes of mental functioning (see van Hoom & Verhave,. 
1980; Leary, 1979). This is best exemplified in Wundt's own later volumes on 
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Volkerpsychologie (1900-1920), a title that is perhaps best translated as "cultural 
psychology." 
In Wundt's conception, the subject matter of this nonexperimental cultural 
psychology included such phenomena as language, myth, custom, social structure, 
law, culture itself, and history, all of which reflect the higher-level working of the 
human mind (in contrast to basic sensation and perception, for example). Wundt 
believed, in brief, that the rigorous demands of experimental control, and the 
equally compelling demand for phenomenal authenticity, could not be simulta-
neously met in the study of these higher-level phenomena. To take a single ex-
ample: in the study of language, one must either forfeit control of experimental 
subjects' prior experience (and hence, idiosyncratic associations) with natural lan-
guage or set up _a strictly controlled study of previously nonexperienced nonsense 
language, whicn ·is, of course, no real language at all. The same sort of dilemma 
can be posed for the study of social-group processes, and so on. In each case, 
Wundt felt, experimentation is doomed to failure. What he proposed in its stead 
was a careful, historical, and cross-cultural investigation of the various products of 
higher mental functioning. In addition to mere data-gathering, he argued for the 
extensive use of rational and comparative analysis as the optimal method for this 
kind of psychology. (In many ways his analytic method was analogous to reductive 
·analysis of the Kantian sort. Wundt asked, in essence, what must be the nature of 
the human mind for it to produce these kinds of phenomena.) Although the actual 
execution of some parts of his program for cultural psychology have been subjected 
to criticism, it is noteworthy that Wundt's study of language has recently been 
acknowledged as a significant forerunner of contemporary psycholinguistics (Blu-
menthal, 1970). 
All in all, then, the real Wundt had a more complex and richly stocked mind 
than one might guess from reading various histories of psychology (e.g., Boring, 
1950) or the polemics of Wundt's critics at Wiirzburg and elsewhere. (For recent 
revisions of Boring's account of Wundt, see Blumenthal, 1975, 1979; Danziger, 
1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c; Leary, 1979; Mischel, 1970; Woodward, 1982.) This 
fact needs to be borne in mind when ·we consider the influence Wundt had on 
psychology in various countries, particularly as regards the two branches of his dual 
program for psychology. In Germany, the United States, Russia, Britain, and even 
xenophobic France, the work of Wundt was of real importance, but the existing 
intellectual traditions in each of these countries led psychologists to select out rather 
different things from the Wundtian corpus for use in their own locales. For the 
most part, they selected out his experimental psychology (and then, only a strange 
facsimile of it), leaving his cultural psychology to have an impact, as it did, only on 
other disciplines, such as linguistics, sociology, anthropology, and even psycho-
analysis. (An interesting exception evolved in Russia, where the work of Lev Vy-
gotsky and Alexander Luria has represented both sides of the Wundtian heritage: 
the experimental and the cultural. See Toulmin, 1978.) 
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In the United States, which will be the locus of our concern, this bifurcation of 
Wundt's psychological program was carried yet another step further. Virtually de 
facto, in its transatlantic migration the new experimental psychology was divorced 
from the philosophical context that had originally nurtured its existence. At the 
same time, it was transplanted into a pragmatic soil that, with each tilling, abided 
overt philosophical nurturance less and less. Although some Americans, such as 
William James, agreed with Wundt in espousing a fundamental relation between 
psychology and philosophy, as a matter of fact their philosophy was such that it 
tended to discourage (or disguise) the free exercise of the philosophic imagination. 
And many others simply denied the need for any philosophy-or even any prelimi-
nary thinking-at all. Edward B. Titchener was not of this persuasion, but his 
positivistic rendering of Wundt's psychology did much to instigate the movement 
toward a reductionistic (albeit introspective) empiricism in American psychology 
(see Danziger, 1979; Leahey, 1981; Tweney & Yachanin, 1980). It was, however, 
Titchener's friend (and systematic opponent), John B. Watson, who best sym-
bolized the trend toward reductionistic empiricism in the United States, especially 
as it became aligned with the development of so-called "objective" psychology. As 
this trend enveloped more and more American psychologists, empiricism ceased to 
be the legitimate source of creative innovations that it had been in physics two 
hundred years before and in biology one hund.red years before. Instead it became 
what we shall call a cult. 
The Temporary Divorce of Psychology from Philosophy 
in the United States 
Interestingly, Watson's famous behaviorist manifesto (1913) appeared in the same 
year as Wundt's equally impassioned defense of the alliance between the "new 
psychology" and philosophy. To be sure, Watson's proclamation was not simply a 
reaction against Wundt, or even against the derivatives of Wundt's psychology in 
America. In fact, from an historical point of view, Watson's manifesto was actually 
only one of a much larger set of factors that contributed to the movement of 
American psychology toward a simplistic form of empiricism. Many of these were 
operative well before and after 1913. Although we cannot review them all, we can 
at least discuss them briefly under several general headings. 
First of all, as we said, the national setting itself made a difference in the· 
assimilation and shaping of the new psychological science. Broadly speaking, the 
practical character of the American temperament, blending at that point in history 
with the progressivist movement toward political and social reform (Goldman, 
1955; Wiebe, 1967), provided a context within which American psychologists were 
called upon, and willingly offered, to apply their new-found methods to the solu-
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tion of real-life problems. Even formerly intransigent "pure" psychologists such as 
the immigrant Hugo Miinsterberg (1908, 1909a, 1909b, 1913, 1914) were con-
verted to, and developed, the various fields of applied psychology. This trend toward 
the practical drew American psychologists away from the former intellectual con-
cerns of their field, so much so by the 1920s that it has been argued (O'Donnell, 
l 979a) that the first ( 1929) edition of E. G. Boring's classic history text was written 
as a defensive reaction against the threat of total encroachment (even within 
academia) by "professional" psychology. At any rate, it is clear that Watson's 
promise of an "objective" science of psychology that would lead (in short order) to 
the prediction and control of behavior was precisely what the reformers, politicians, 
and businessmen-trustees wanted to hear (Burnham, 1968; O'Donnell, 1979b). 
The fit between perceived social needs and the goals of applied, and particularly 
behavioristic, psychology was fortunate, to say the least. 
Within this context, it is not surprising that the apparently successful applications 
of psychology accelerated the trend away from a conceptually rich interdisciplinary 
psychology (see Crennan & Kingsbury, 1923). Indeed, even some of the less valid 
applications, as in the army intelligence testing program during World War I 
(Samelson, 1979), passed for major achievements which buttressed the legitimacy 
of the new profession. In order to understand the emergence of the cult of empiri-
cism, it is necessary to acknowledge the imagined as well as the real accomplish-
ments of the first generation of applied psychologists. 
Meanwhile, at the same time that psychology was moving away from philosophy 
under its own momentum, American philosophy itself reinforced psychology's 
trajectory. Although this is rarely appreciated, it was not generally the case (Harvard 
being a notable exception) that psychologists had to fight their way out of philoso-
phy departments, and thus away from their past associations with philosophy. As 
often as not, philosophers were in the vanguard of the movement calling for an 
autonomous psychology. Sometimes crying "psychologism," they argued that the 
alliance between psychology and philosophy had to be broken, for the sake of 
philosophy as much as psychology. There were clearly economic motives involved 
in this campaign, but there were also .intellectual reasons (Leary, 1979). Increas-
ingly, around the turn of the century, philosophers became aware that their goals, 
methods, and interests were not always coextensive with those of psychologists. As a 
result, in 1901 they founded the American Philosophical Association as a splinter 
group from the American Psychological Association, which had served as a profes-
sional organization for both psychologists and philosophers since its inception in 
1892. Even after 1901, the psychologists and philosophers continued for a time to 
meet together. (In many cases, of course, the ps>chologist and philosopher was one 
and the same person.) But over the next decade the connections dwindled. Still, the 
point is that the numerous debates that were held in the early 1900s regarding the 
proper affiliation of psychology-whether it should maintain its traditional relation 
to philosophy or become one of the natural sciences-helped to set the scene for 
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Watson's later proclamation (see Smith, 1981). Watson was no more the first to call 
for psychology's independence from philosophy than he was the first to call for 
objective methods and the extirpation of subjectivist terminology from psychology. 
In fact, a select group of philosophers foreshadowed and influenced subsequent 
developments in this latter respect. Building upon the earlier pragmatism of C. S. 
Peirce and William James, neorealists such as Edwin B. Holt and Ralph Barton 
Perry called for an objectivistic interpretation of sensation, perception, conscious-
ness, cognition, behavior, purpose, and so on (see Holt et al., 1910, 1912). Their 
philosophical orientation had a very profound influence, for example, upon the 
thinking of Edward C. Tolman (see Smith, 1982). Although their stance was not 
entirely antimetaphysical, their works (and those of other neorealist philosophers) 
contained antispeculative undertones. Contemporaneously, another philosopher, 
E. A. Singer (1911), anticipated the main emphases of Watsonian behaviorism, 
directly influencing the career choice of Edwin Guthrie (Smith, 1981, pp. 34-3 5). 
It is probable that acquaintance with the works of such philosophers predisposed 
some of the more philosophically inclined psychologists toward objective modes of 
analysis. Together with the later development of critical realism and neopragma-
tism, their views would have reinforced the movement toward an empiricistic 
psychology. 
Of course, some American psychologists simply had no taste for philosophical 
discourse. Among these were certainly Watson and Edward L. Thorndike, whose 
unhappy experiences with John Dewey and Josiah Royce, respectively, had left 
unpleasant associations (Smith, 1981). Following in the footsteps of Charles Dar-
win, George J. Romanes, and C. Lloyd Morgan-and together with Robert M. 
Yerkes, among others-they turned away from traditional introspective, human 
psychology and did pioneer research in the area of animal psychology. This re-
search clearly influenced their later approach to human psychology, serving as a 
natural prologue to their articulation of a behavioral point of view. In addition, 
Watson was influenced by the objectivistic biology of Jacques Loeb, the zoological 
research of H. S. Jennings, and (after 1913) the reflexology of Ivan Pavlov and 
Vladimir Bekhterev (Watson, 1936), much as B. F. Skinner was later influenced by 
William J. Crozier's approach to the study of physiological "conduct" (Skinner, 
1979, pp. 44-46). This shift of allegiance from philosophy to the biological sci-
ences did not mean, of course, that they-or any other "objective" psychologists-
avoided taking philosophical stances in their work: it was (and is) impossible to avoid 
such stances. But in their attempts to get out of the orbit of philosophical discourse, 
these psychologists produced an antiphilosophical rhetoric that came to typify be-
havioral psychology in the United States. Although many other psychologists were 
less drastically disaffiliated from philosophy than they, this rhetoric, wedded to the 
slowly evolving modern psychology-journal style, operated as something of a self-
fulfilling prophecy. When psychologists and philosophers began to find themselves 
in separate departments, speaking different languages and publishing in different 
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journals, the long-time public marriage of their disciplines was temporarily over. 
Psychologists had heard the "empiricist message," and they proceeded to emphasize 
empirical work at the expense of psychological theory (see Bruner & Allport, 1940). 
Watson's Empiricistic Program for Psychology and 
Its Constrictive Influence 
Although his so-called "classical" behaviorism did not take over American psychol-
ogy as instantaneously and completely as sometimes thought (Sarnelson, 1981), 
Watson's psychology strongly contributed to the development of the cult of empiri-
cism in American psychology. If the inspiration of his creed came from animal 
psychology ancF objectivistic biology, Watson's ultimate model was derived from 
physics. His resolution was to make psychology as close to experimental physics as 
he knew how, banishing all subjective appeals to introspectable data and focusing 
exclusively on public, observable reactions to arbitrary stimuli. Despite his insis-
tence on objective techniques of observation, it is interesting to note that his 
consequent use of basic terms such as "stimulus" and "response" was anything but 
precise and consistent, as he himself admitted (Watson, 1919, pp. 9-15). In fact, 
Watson's continual reliance on mechanical analogies in his published works served 
as a sort of verbal camouflage for the fact that the empiricism he espoused was more 
of an idealized prescription than a real description of his own work. This is partly 
what we mean when we speak of empiricism becoming the object of a cult: it was 
more praised in omission than honored by commission. This point would be driven 
further home if we could take the time to analyze Watson's basically ad hoc, 
metaphorical, extrapolative use of the notion of the reflex and Pavlovian condition-
ing. Under present constraints, however, we shall simply invite the reader to con-
sider Watson's views (1924, Chap. 12) on the reduction of personality to reflexol-
ogy, and try to find an adequate evidential basis for his claims. 
The postulation of objective technique and the focus (however fuzzy) on 
stimulus-response relations led naturally enough to the other major characteristics 
of Watsonian behaviorism-its peripheralism, its emphasis on learning, and its 
environmentalism (Koch, 1961; 1964, pp. 7-9). Even at the "periphery" of the 
organism, however, basic activity is not always so easily observed. As a conse-
quence, Watson's assertion that certain "inner" responses (such as thinking) are 
effectively "represented" by various muscular movements (such as those of the 
larynx) was far less influential than his attempts to correlate external "stimuli" with 
subsequent overt physical "responses" (Watson, 1919, Chap. 9; 1924, Chap. 10). 
Thus, in practice, the classical behaviorist program led toward a radical shrinking of 
the range of topics for psychological investigation and theorizing, despite Watson's 
avowed intention to account for a broad spectrum of psychological phenomena, 
including thinking. 
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This constriction of the subject matter of psychology was furthered by the behav-
iorist emphasis on learning and on the influence of the environment. Coming from 
a background in animal psychology, Watson wanted to focus on the adaptation of 
the organism to its environment; and because he held certain utopian ideals about 
the improvement of the social order, he was also interested in the possibility of the 
prosocial, behavioral adaptation of the organism to an environment manipulated 
according to human design (sec Morawski, 1982). It is not surprising, then, that 
Watson's psychology became almost entirely a psychology of acquired adaptive 
responding. But as behaviorism exerted more and more influence on the psycholog-
ical scene, this emphasis on learning, and on the impact of the environment, 
became rather too preemptive, and psychologists began to overlook even the basic 
processes underlying their vaunted empiricism: for several decades, sensation and 
perception were methodologically taken for granted but theoretically and empiri-
cally ignored by the majority of American psychologists. Perhaps nothing illustrates 
so well the development of a naive, cult-like empiricism as this basically know-
nothing attitude toward the fundamental processes underlying the acquisition of 
empirical knowledge. 
New Links between Psychology and Philosophy 
For some time now, we have been pointing our fingers at Watson's psychology. 
But, of course, classical behaviorism is something of the past, even if its legacy is 
not. Not all the evils of subsequent times can be laid directly at its door. The 
orthodoxy that controlled American psychology from the 1930s until (approxi-
mately) the mid-l 950s was not Watsonian but "neobehaviorist"; and there were not 
one, but several forms of this orthodoxy (see Koch, 1959, 1964, 1976). It was 
under the aegis of these revisionist versions of behaviorism that the cult of empiri-
cism achieved its most complete formulation and its practical dominion over Amer-
ican psychology. What is particularly remarkable, in view of the putative banish-
ment of philosophy from psychology, is the way in which this formulation and 
domination was effected with the complicity of a certain kind of philosophy. By the 
1930s, psychologists had apparently gained enough confidence in their new experi-
mental discipline that they began to listen to philosophers once again, and they 
liked what they heard: for they listened to a group of philosophers-by and large, 
the Viennese logical positivists-who were speaking a dialect closely related to their 
own objectivistic language. That they were attracted to the neopositivist philoso-
phers was natural enough. Given their common empiricist heritage, the behav-
iorists and logical positivists had a good deal in common. In fact, through the earlier 
influence of Watson on Bertrand Russell, and Russell's impact on the logical 
positivists, there was an actual historical link between behaviorism and logical 
positivism (Smith, 1981). It is not surprising, then, that logical positivism pro-
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vided support for the major orientations of the newly developing versions of behav-
iorism. 
Indeed, it is only a slight caricature to represent neobehaviorism as the product of 
the remarriage of psychology, in the guise of behaviorism, and philosophy, in the 
guise of logical positivism (Koch, 1961; 1964, p. 12). Although there were internal 
trends within behaviorism itself, as well as philosophical and methodological trends 
indigenous to the United States, that led toward the redefinition of the behaviorist 
program, the confluence of behaviorism and logical positivism constituted the 
major factor in the development of the orthodoxy that ruled American psychology 
for at least twenty years, and still remains a tangible, if somewhat less reputable, 
directive force. For a marriage of limited fertility, and a marriage in which one of 
the partners (logical positivism) retreated from its vows almost from the beginning, 
this is truly amazing. In fact, it is difficult to explain the abiding hold of the 
neopositivist philosophy of science without reference to the cult-like belief that the 
marriage inspired. 
The first step toward understanding this resilient belief in the complex of assump-
tions propagated by the behaviorist-positivist alliance can be taken by examining the 
context within which the belief was generated in the first place. By the late.1920s 
and early 1930s, it had become apparent that the promise of classical behaviorism 
remained unfulfilled. Rather than solving all the intellectual problems of the disci-
pline and curing the various practical problems of the world, behaviorism had failed 
even to silence the cacophony of voices within psychology. Although the general 
objectivistic orientation of behaviorism had gained a wide range of adherents, other 
"schools of psychology" had continued to develop throughout the 1920s (see Heid-
breder, 1933; Murchison, 1926, 1930; Woodworth, 1931). Objcctivism in data 
collection was one thing; agreement about specific modes of objcctivism, and about 
the theoretical implications of "objective" data, was something else. What was 
needed was some sort of "decision procedure" (sec Koch, 1959, p. 37lff.; 1964, 
p. 9ff. ), by which psychologists could reach agreement not only about the specifics 
of methodological procedure, but also about the appropriateness and definition of 
theoretical terms and the proper conduct of theoretical discourse. In the midst of 
apparent conceptual anarchy, even those who had banished speculative, metaphys-
ical theory from psychology decided that psychologists had to adopt some sort of 
technique for reaching consensus about the meaning of their empirical results. 
Within this context, logical positivism satisfied the needs of the moment. First of 
all, it passed inspection by being as virulently antimctaphysical as the most dog-
matic form of behaviorism. At the foundation of the logical positivist program was 
the belief that all statements arc either analytic (and thus tautological), empirical 
(and thus verified by observation), or meaningless (Carnap, l 932/l 959a). As a 
result, according to the original logical positivist creed, theoretical statements were 
either logical tautologies, propositions reducible to empirical content, or nonsense. 
Any theories exceeding (even if not contradicting) the restrictive domain of verified 
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observation were consigned to the latter category. This included carefully conjec-
tural considerations of fundamental issues as well as out-and-out metaphysical 
speculations about the nature of the mind, organism, behavior, and so on-the 
kind of speculations that typified early (as well as later) theoretical discourse in the 
natural and biological sciences. Thus, the "new philosophy," which had modeled 
itself on a particular conception of science, legitimized (we might have said 
"sanctified") the empiricism of "objective" psychology. Psychologists were only too 
eager to pledge allegiance to this new code since it seemed to provide a program by 
which they could finally achieve scientific-not to mention philosophical-
respectability. It had become only too embarrassing for them to contemplate the 
empirical state of affairs in their less than unified and progressive discipline. 
In corroborating the behaviorists' emphasis on objectivism, logical positivism 
offered a specific criterion by which the meaning of terms could be empirically 
defined. "Physicalism," as the logical positivists defined it, entailed the formulation 
of a data-base language in which all terms could be defined by reference to intersub-
jectively observable, physical objects and events. This criterion formalized the 
behaviorists' own objectivistic leaning and made it prescriptive for all the sciences. 
As a result, it brought psychology (at least potentially) within the fold of so-called 
"unified science." One of the major logical positivists, Rudolf Carnap (1932/ 
l 959b), applied the physicalist criterion directly to psychology, admitting that the 
successful adoption of such a criterion would depend upon the open-mindedness of 
psychologists who might well have an "emotional resistance" to the prospect of a 
physicalistic psychology. 
The neobehaviorists, of course, had no such emotional reaction. The message of 
physicalism seemed to corroborate not only their own unsophisticated objectivism, 
but also the recent proclamation of operationalism by the Harvard physicist Percy 
W. Bridgman (1927). This operationalism had a substantial impact on American 
psychologists. Early on, it was reflected in the methodological orientation of E. G. 
Boring (1933); later, it was given influential formulation by S. S. Stevens (l935a, 
1935b, 1939); and under the joint inspiration of neorealist philosophy, it led to the 
tradition of "intervening variables" begun by E. C. Tolman (1935, 1936) and relied 
upon by Clark Hull (1943a). Strengthened and justified by its fusion with the 
meaning-criterion of early logical positivist philosophy of science, the influence of 
the operationalist approach to the definition of theoretical terms can be seen in 
American psychology to this very day, despite the criticism and recantations of the 
former promoters of orthodox logical positivism (Koch, 1964, 1976). 
Indeed, by the mid-1930s, Carnap (1936-1937) and other neopositivist philoso-
phers of science (e.g., Hempel, 1935/1949) had begun to realize that their early 
interpretation of the criterion of meaning, especially as applied to psychology, was 
unrealistic, and they continued to liberalize the logical positivist position-almost 
beyond recognition-over the subsequent decades (see Hempel, 1950; Toulmin, 
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1969, 1977). But as Sigmund Koch (1964, pp. 21-25) has noted, this liberalization 
was hardly noticed, much less imitated, by the neobehaviorists and their successors, 
who held (and continue to hold) on to earlier operationalistic conceptions in a 
manner that can only be described as wish-fulfilling (or fetishistic). As Smith (1981) 
has pointed out, several of the leading logical positivists have admitted that "prog-
ress in psychology has been impeded by the influence of the earlier strict versions of 
the meaning criterion" (p. 36; see Carnap, 1956, p. 70; Feigl, 1951, pp. 201, 204-
205). 
The logical positivist creed also offered the neobehaviorists a view of scientific 
laws that helped psychologists resolve their uncertainty about the structure of 
theoretical discourse. The logical positivist prescription for a theory appeared in 
different variations (see Suppe, 1977), but all these variations required that a theory 
be capable of befog "rationally reconstructed" into a deductive form. Working from 
the top down, scientific theories (in this general conception) must provide a set of 
statements from which the pertinent empirical phenomena can be deduced. In 
practical terms, scientific theories should be composed of fundamental laws or 
hypotheses that are asserted as postulates. From these, lower-level theorems should 
be deducible by the strict application of the rules of logic and/or mathematics. 
These theorems should then be testable by experiment (in the course of which 
scientists should use physicalist [translate: operational] modes of definition). In 
summary, proper scientific theory should constitute a hypothetico-deductive sys-
tem. 
As is well known, Clark Hull (1943b, 1951, 1952) became the major advocate of 
this form of theorizing in psychology. Indeed, he made it the supreme goal of 
psychological science. Without a hypothetico-deductive system of theory, he was 
convinced, psychology would be no science at all. He believed this, we should 
point out, despite the evidence of history which attests to an almost unending 
panoply of "scientific" forms. If Hull used Newtonian science as the prototype of a 
hypothetico-deductive system, he might just as well have used it, in another of its 
aspects, .as the prototype of an empirico-inductive discipline (see Guerlac, 1965; 
Schofield, 1970, esp. Chap. l ). His acceptance of the logical positivist prescription 
of hypothetico-deductive systematization must be seen, on the historical evidence, 
as the acceptance of a corroboration of a personal viewpoint, not some timeless or 
necessary truth. Hull's own bias for logical, hierarchical explanations preceded his 
contact with logical positivism; indeed-unlike many of the psychologists who 
inherited his hypothetico-deductive zeal-he did not in his writings appeal to 
logical positivism for authority, nor is it clear that he was a keen student of the 
position (Smith, in press). 
Through his station as a major teacher and leader at the Yale Institute of Human 
Relations, as well as through his influential publications, the hypothetico-deductive 
model achieved near hegemony in the heyday of neobehaviorism. Only when his 
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own drastic revisions (Hull, 1951, 1952) of his own hypothetico-deductive system 
(Hull, l943b) were published did his espousal of a radically logical, hierarchically 
structured, unified theory of psychology come to be seen as vastly premature at best 
(Koch, 1954). But in many ways Hull's philosophy of science endures, in somewhat 
attenuated form, to the present time-in the many minisystem models that have 
taken the place of his grand theory, in the prescribed format style for dissertations 
and journal articles, in the introductory chapters of psychology textbooks, and thus 
in the general lore of the field. And again, these conceptual straitjackets persist 
despite all the reactions, and all the developments, in the philosophy of science over 
the past decades. 
There were, of course, some neobehaviorists who escaped the influence of the 
logical positivists. B. F. Skinner, for instance, took his inspiration from the older 
positivism of Ernst Mach (see Skinner, 1979, pp. 66-67). But this only means that 
his is an even sparer form of empiricism. Trying to banish not only metaphysics but 
also theory from his psychology, Skinner has relied on the most naive form of 
empiricism imaginable, assuming that the "facts" will speak for themselves. This is 
perhaps the ultimate expression of the cult of empiricism-of faith in the data. 
Ironically, such naive empiricism, precisely because it disavows its dependence 
upon the theoretical realm, is all the more likely to be a vehicle of unexamined 
metaphysical assumptions about the nature. of the data, the organism, and the 
world. 
In concluding this discussion of neobehaviorism, it is only proper to acknowledge 
that not all psychologists in America between the 1930s and 1950s were neobehav-
iorists. Yet it seems entirely safe to say that the neobehaviorists, particularly Hull, 
set the dominant tone for this period. Additionally, the general characteristics we 
have outlined-the antimetaphysical temper, the operationalist approach, and the 
hypothetico-deductive ideal-governed the activity of the majority of psychologists 
throughout this period, whether they were behaviorists or not. Clearly, there were 
exceptions. Egon Brunswik (1943, 1947), for example, rejected the hypothetico-
deductive ideal, even though he accepted the other basic tenets of neobehaviorism. 
But the exceptions proved the rule. Although Brunswik was highly respected, his 
critique was neither understood nor accepted. Even nonbehaviorists, such as Kurt 
Lewin ( 194 3), rejected Brunswik's criticism of the dominant prescription. Yet from 
an historical perspective we can see once again that the dominant prescription was 
just that: a prescription. Since the publication of the multivolumcd Psychology: A 
Study of a Science (Koch, 1959-1963), it has been clear that much of the theorizing 
that had been going on in psychology had not conformed to the requirements of 
hypothetico-deductive systematization (see Koch, 1959). Nor for that matter had 
psychologists really avoided all metaphysical commitments; nor had they always 
utilized-or even believed-in the lore about operationalism! But this acknowledg-
ment was rather tardy. During the "age of theory" (Koch, 1959), psychologists had 
not so readily confessed their sins against the god of Empiricism. 
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The Cult of Empiricism and Its Results 
With all the foregoing as historical background, we can now {finally) explore several 
features of what we are here calling the "cult" of empiricism among American 
psychologists. Although we have already suggested a number of reasons for referring 
to a cult of empiricism, we should once and for all justify our deliberate choice of a 
prejudicial word. To recapitulate and expand our argument: among experimental 
psychologists in the United States from roughly the 1920s on, a commitment to 
"empiricism" rapidly became something which (like the doctrine of the Trinity) it 
was more important to accept than to understand. These experimental psychologists 
came to regard theoretical questions that were not tied directly to the analysis of 
"controlled experiments" as self-discrediting: self-discrediting as arguments, since 
their nonempirical origins were sufficient to demonstrate their emptiness; and self-
discrediting even as speech acts, since any psychologist who spent time on such 
irrelevant matters would be talking evident nonsense and so be professionally un-
sound. And this was something that had never happened, either in physics after 
1650, or in biology after 1780. Newton and Leibniz, Bichat and Muller, Helmholtz 
and Bernard had all had broad and highly philosophical interests. 
Stepping back from our earlier historical survey, we want now to present a 
conceptual overview and analysis of this cult of empiricism. We shall argue that this 
cult rested on three distinguishable but connected strands of argument. These had 
to do (1) with the nature and purpose of "scientific" observations and, more 
specifically, with the purpose of "controlling" those observations; (2) with the need 
to limit theoretical hypotheses and constructions to those arising out of, and se-
curely supported by, the results of "controlled observations"; and (3) with the prize 
that could seemingly be won only by confining oneself to this particular empirical 
model, viz., universality {which would be expressed, for most of the neobehavior-
ists, as some sort of law in the upper reaches of a hypothetico-deductive system). 
Only those who stuck to narrowly controlled experimental procedures (it was be-
lieved) could hope to formulate theories guaranteed to apply to all human beings 
(not to mention animals), regardless of all the diversities associated with cultural 
variations and historical changes. 
Once these three claims are set out separately in this way, it becomes clear why 
one must speak of this as a cult of "empiricism" rather than of "experimental 
method." Since the time of Francis Bacon-long before the advent of logical 
positivism-items 2 and 3, in particular, have been essential elements within the 
tradition of philosophical empiricism. Empiricist philosophers have repeatedly 
claimed that controlled observations alone, as prescribed under item 2, provide the 
indispensable means to achieve universalizable results, as specified in item 3. The 
empiricist formula for establishing universal generalizations has been, precisely, to 
confine theoretical speculation to the results of controlled observation. Further-
more, while we can distinguish these three elements in the program of American 
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experimental psychology in retrospect, they were originally conceived as three 
aspects of a single program, and in actual practice they worked together. According 
to this program, as we have seen, it was assumed that psychology could make 
progress as a science only by taking three closely related steps. First, psychologists 
had to cut themselves loose from all the verbiage of earlier philosophical specula-
tion; next, they had to create for themselves a theoretical tabula rasa-an empty 
field or flat conceptual space, awaiting the erection of some vast and disinfected 
scientific emporium; and, finally, they had to throw up new "logical constructions" 
de nova, as building material became available from controlled experiments. 
In the last fifty years, the discussion among psychologists about "theory construc-
tion" (to use a phrase that is unknown in physics and biology) has gone through two 
successive phases, both of which have been influenced by arguments within 
neopositivist philosophy of science and inductive logic. In the first place, as we have 
seen, American experimental psychologists followed the recipes for theory con-
struction put forward by such philosophers as Rudolf Carnap and C. G. Hempel in 
their debates, e.g., about the legitimacy of using "intervening variables" in psycho-
logical explanations and theories. What was called "theory construction" had thus, 
in actual fact, nothing to do with the older traditions of scientific theorizing as 
developed by physicists and biologists. Instead, it represented a kind of "logical 
construction" of more complex propositions out of simpler ones, according to 
models set out by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and their successors in the 
program of twentieth-century symbolic logic (Toulmin, 1969). 
For the ti~e being, it escaped the notice of working psychologists that the 
positivist account of natural science was a formal logicians' fiction and had only a 
very limited application to real-life science. It could not be applied to contemporary 
physics: Carnap himself ( 1950), for instance, refused to address questions about 
quantum mechanics, on the ground that the quantum theory had never been 
"formulated according to the rigorous standards of modern logic" (p. 243). And it 
gave an impoverished account of biology: Carl Hempel (1965), for instance, dis-
missed Darwin's theory of evolution as not really being "scientific" at all, at least by 
the formal standards of logical empiricism (p. 370). Since they allied themselves 
with a particularly narrow and dogmatic school of philosophers, then, it is not 
surprising if the psychologists' own results were themselves narrowly dogmatic. In 
the extreme case, only those theoretical statements that could be "logically con-
structed" out of observational measurements alone were regarded as "well-founded" 
in experience; and it became the ambition of some, following Hull's example, to 
leap directly to a theory of psychological phenomena as fully axiomatic as Newton's 
theory of dynamics in the Principia. 
Subsequently, from the mid-l 950s on, many psychologists became disappointed 
at the scanty results achieved as a consequence of all this "theory construction" and 
"axiomatization." They also wanted to escape from the dominance of the 
neobehaviorists and began to espouse pluralism in the methods and concepts of 
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psychology. This was, in its own way, a promising enough move. If their pluralism 
had been grounded in a proper understanding of the relations between the 
methodologies of the different branches of psychology-like the understanding that 
validates, for example, the division of authority in biology between cell biology, 
general physiology, developmental biology, and evolution theory-all might yet 
have been well. But that would have meant confronting the problems of psychology 
head on, and analyzing them in their own terms-i.e., generating a truly theoret-
ical account of those problems. Most psychologists were not yet ready to do so. 
Instead, they were content to go on as before, taking as their guide and authority the 
outdated words of logicians and philosophers of science, rather than the digested 
fruit of their own experience. Then, under the influence of T. S. Kuhn's Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions (1962), the move toward pluralism quickly lapsed into a 
shallow relativism-"You choose your paradigm, and leave me to choose mine." 
This second phase is, of course, still with us. 
Meanwhile, the other two elements in the empiricist program have also 
generated lasting difficulties of their own. These requirements were (to recall) the 
necessity to perform only "controlled" experiments and the desirability of achieving 
"universality" in the resulting generalizations. On the one hand, the recipe for 
"controlling" psychological experiments was commonly interpreted as requiring the 
elimination of all external, situational cues by which experimental subjects might 
be led to attribute "meaning" to the stimuli that were the subject matter of experi-
ments. On the other hand, the goal of "universality" was typically construed as 
requiring psychologists to begin by abstracting from all possible historical epochs 
and cultures, with the intention of eliminating all the local or temporary (and so 
presumably nonuniversalizable) influences that are the subject matter of "cultural 
psychology," or Volkerpsychologie. 
The first of these demands explains the widespread emphasis, found in much 
American experimental psychology since the 1920s, on the need for experimental 
arrays of stimuli or attributes to be purely arbitrary-i.e., thought up ad hoc by the 
experimenter. Only such arbitrary experimental material was supposedly controlla-
ble enough to yield "objective" results. Only in this way, it seemed, could experi-
ments be insulated from the extraneous influence of current preexisting "meanings" 
and associations. Unfortunately, this demand for "culture-free" observations had 
the effect of destroying the entire "sense" of the material under investigation. In 
particular, it prevented experimental psychologists from considering how any given 
body of experimental material related to the larger-scale human enterprises from 
which it drew its significance in actual practice. A classic illustration is provided by 
Clark Hull's (1920) study of concept formation, which utilized arbitrary Chinese 
characters as experimental stimuli. More recent is the account given by W. C. Holz 
and N. H. Azrin (1966) in their survey article, "Conditioning Human Verbal 
Behavior." This article attempted to provide an exhaustive account of recent re-
search on the subject, and the authors se~ out to achieve true "objectivity" by dint of 
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rejecting all observations that had not been totally shielded from all extraneous 
contextual cues. The result of insisting on this demand for absolute objectivity was 
striking and drastic: Holz and Azrin found themselves with nothing to report aside 
from experiments on meaningless vocalizations-e.g., the learning of nonsense 
syllables, the utterances oflunatics, and techniques for improving subjects' capacity 
to articulate sibilants! 
As for the second demand (that experimental psychology should guarantee its 
own universality by abstracting in advance from all possible cultural differences), 
this requirement has tended, in practice, to blind experimental psychologists to 
actual "cultural universals," and these are now proving to be of considerable 
significance. In this respect, indeed, the novel methods of investigation of actual 
constancies in human nature developed by the crosscultural psychologists-e.g., 
Brent Berlin and Paul Kay (1969) and Eleanor Rosch (1973, 1977, 1978) in their 
studies on color perception and categorization (see Mervis & Rosch, 1981, for a 
review)-represent a major break with the assumptions underlying much American 
experimental psychology since the 1920s. If many of the people involved in this 
novel crosscultural work have come to experimental psychology from cultural an-
thropology or animal-behavior studies, that is no accident. For the new field of 
"crosscultural psychology" successfully straddles Wundt's dividing line between 
"experimental psychology" and "cultural psychology." And this gives us a way of 
moving not only beyond the narrower limits set by Wundt's American successors 
but also outsi~e the more generous limits set by Wilhelm Wundt himself. 
Beyond Wundt and Beyond the Cult of Empiricism: Toward a 
More Unified and Expansive Conception of Psychology 
Wilhelm Wundt (as we have seen) understood cultural psychology, on the one 
hand, and experimental psychology, on the other, to be concerned with phenom-
ena that could be distinguished and separated in advance. Some human mental 
activities and functions lent themselves, in Wundt's eyes, to experimental study, 
while others lent themselves rather to historico-cultural investigation; and, once this 
division had been clearly made, there was no way of going back on it. By contrast, 
the crosscultural psychologists of the 1970s and 1980s see experimental psychology 
itself as having something to learn from the results of anthropological studies. 
Instead of abstracting from all possible cultures and so losing the significance of all 
"meanings," the crosscultural psychologists seek to generalize from all actual cul-
tures and so to discover what "meanings" are in fact universal, and so, generaliz-
able. Eleanor Rosch's (1973) work on "salient colors," following Berlin and Kay's 
(1969) pioneer work in the linguistics of color, is an excellent example. What it 
illustrates is that by making a preliminary digression into Volkerpsychologie, we are 
not banishing ourselves from experimental psychology in perpetuity. On the con-
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trary, we may subsequently be able to come back out of Volkerpsychologie into 
experimental psychology and enrich it with new discoveries of kinds that were 
precluded both by Wundt's dichotomization of psychology and by the traditional 
methodology of experimental psychology in America. 
To spell this point out more clearly: the experimental psychology that has lent 
itself to an honest marriage with cultural anthropology, and so helped to create the 
crosscultural psychology of the present day, is not the dogmatic, positivistic psychol-
ogy of the 1920s to 19 50s. It is not, in other words, the psychology that had 
condemned itself to incoherence and meaninglessness as a result of its own chosen 
methods and assumptions. Rather, it is the more modest experimentalism that had 
originated in the psychophysics of Weber and Fechner and in the sensory psychol-
ogy (the so-called "physiological optics") of Hermann von Helmholtz, before being 
taken up and developed by Wundt and his contemporaries. For in psychology, as in 
physics and biology earlier, a sufficiently unpretentious experimentalism allied to 
clearheaded analytical arguments (philosophical, conceptual, or theoretical, call 
them what you will) was quite capable of keeping out of trouble. And the experi-
mental procedures of (say} a Helmholtz can usefully be taken into the field and 
employed for the purpose of crosscultural inquiries, in New Guinea or Nigeria as 
well as in New Hampshire or Nebraska. 
In this respect at least, we have at last reached a point at which Wundt's two 
separate research programs for psychology are beginning to come together. It is 
reasonable to hope that, from now on, those who are concerned with the study of 
the cultural aspects of higher mental functioning will, increasingly, take with them 
into the field methods of inquiry developed by the experimental psychologists. 
Conversely, we can hope and expect that the outcomes of their cultural investiga-
tions will; increasingly, feed back illuminating concepts and generalizations suit-
able for study within the experimental laboratory. If this occurs, the dividing line 
between the two classes of mental functions and activities that lend themselves to 
investigation by experimental and historico-cultural methods, respectively, will be 
seen to be a good deal more fuzzy and blurred than Wundt originally assumed. 
Even mo're subversive, from the standpoint of hardline experimental methodol-
ogy, is another conclusion to which the new crosscultural psychology has recently 
been leading. To quote an observation by Eleanor Rosch (1978}: 
When a context is not specified in an experiment, people [i.e., experimental 
subjects] must contribute their own context. Presumably ... in the absence of 
specified context, subjects assume what they consider the normal context or situa-
tion for the occurrence of that object (i.e., the situation or stimulus under experi-
mental investigation] (pp. 42-43). 
If these observations are correct, then all the precautions that hardheaded American 
experimental psychologists have relied on since the 1920s in order to ensure the 
"objectivity" of experimental material by insulating it against extraneous associa-
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tions have been in vain. For the only effect of these precautions has been to drive 
experimental subjects back to their unanalyzed assumptions about "the normal 
contexts" and the actual patterns of events in daily life that lead us to impute 
"meanings" to objects. In short, the emergence of crosscultural psychology makes it 
not merely possible to bring back into experimental psychology material from which 
it has been cut off for quite some time: it makes it compulsory to do so. 
At the same time, with reference to the residual dogmatic empiricism that is the 
legacy of the neobehaviorist era, we can hope and expect that an increased freedom 
of thought will typify future psychology. We are not thinking here of a lazy, 
undisciplined, relativistic approach to psychological theory. Empiricism has its own 
legitimate role, as does the quest for universality. The search for empirically 
grounded theories of broad scope has characterized science in all its many forms. 
But there needs to be room for the creative play of the scientific imagination. 
History abounds with instances of important empirical observations that were made 
only after-and on account of-the formulation of significant theoretical insights. 
To cite one example alone: John Hughlings Jackson's important discoveries regard-
ing the neurophysiological correlates of aphasia were dependent upon Jackson's 
belief in Herbert Spencer's theory of evolutionary associationism (Young, 1970, 
Chap. 6). In addition, there needs to be room for serious thinking about the 
fundamental (including metaphysical) issues that underlie the field of psychology. 
Even Ernst Mach (1896), the arch-positivist, insisted that great scientific investiga-
tions could ~e "carried out only by a [person] who is inspired by a great and 
philosophically most profound view of the world" (p. 240). In recent years, in some 
of the "harder" areas of psychology (e.g., Eccles, 1953; Pribram, 1971; Sperry, 
1969), serious reflection of the sort we are suggesting has begun to take place. This 
is a trend that deserves tp continue. 
One last comment: it is not only thinking that suffered because of American 
psychology's cult of empiricism. As we have tried to indicate, empiricism itself 
suffered because of the rigid, experimental fetters that were placed upon it. Surely 
there should be room too for a retreat, at least by some, from experimental empiri-
cism. All science, and probably all speculation, originates at a more basic level of 
empiricism: the level of experience. In a discipline that is often confused about its 
subject matter, it is not a bad idea to return to basic experience from time to time. 
The natural taxonomy that arises therefrom is much more likely to provide a useful 
framework for experimental work than the artificial taxonomies that structure so 
much of the field today. 
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